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Abstract: The article presents and discusses long-run series of per capita GDP and 
life expectancy for Italy and Spain (1861-2008). After refining the available estimates in 
order to make them comparable and with the avail of the most up-to-date researches, 
the main changes in the international economy and in technological and socio-
biological regimes are used as analytical frameworks to re-assess the performances of 
the two countries; then structural breaks are searched for and Granger causality 
between the two variables is investigated. The long-run convergence notwithstanding, 
significant cyclical differences between the two countries can be detected: Spain began 
to modernize later in GDP, with higher volatility in life expectancy until recent decades; 
by contrast, Italy showed a more stable pattern of life expectancy, following early 
breaks in per capita GDP, but also a negative GDP break in the last decades. Our 
series confirm that, whereas at the early stages of development differences in GDP 
tend to mirror those in life expectancy, this is no longer true at later stages of 
development, when, if any, there seems to be a negative correlation between GDP and 
life expectancy: this finding is in line with the thesis of a non-monotonic relation 
between life expectancy and GDP and is supported by tests of Granger causality. 
 
Keywords: Italy, Spain, GDP, life expectancy, unified growth theory, demographic 
transition 
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1. Introduction 
When dealing with the long-run determinants of economic growth at the national 
level, i.e. with macro-economic history, from quantitative grounds two are the most 
                                                
1 Acknowledgements: helpful advice has come from Antonio Escudero, Francesco Gallio, Roser Nicolau; the usual 
disclaimers apply. The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry for Science and 
Innovation, project HAR2010-20684-C02-01. 
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popular approaches: cross-country studies, usually with the avail of cross-section data, 
or country-specific studies, usually with the avail of time series.2 In cross-country 
studies, the data at hand are usually limited to a few benchmark years, or to short 
periods of time; although a wide range of countries and indicators may be included and 
discussed, the lack of time-series may prevent from dealing efficaciously with 
endogeneity, even when instrumental variables are used.3 Time-series macroeconomic 
analyses of specific countries or regions are of course much more complete in 
historical coverage and usually make use of updated and refined data,4 but this usually 
comes at the cost of international comparisons.5  
In this article, we extend time-series econometrics to a comparison between two or 
more countries: our goal is to maintain some degree of generalization (l’espris de 
geometrie), without losing in accuracy (l’espris de finesse). Namely, we present long-
run time-series comparisons between the two most important countries of Southern 
Europe, Italy and Spain − which are usually regarded similar for culture and values, for 
some key institutional features and even for economic performance6 − and compare 
them with France, their main neighbouring country to which both have often looked up 
as a proper term of evaluation. Our analysis focuses on economic monetary indicators 
(GDP at constant prices) and social no-monetary ones (life expectancy), running from 
the year of Italy’s Unification (1861) until the outbreak of the present economic crisis 
(2008). The long-run convergence notwithstanding, are there significant cyclical 
differences between the two countries, and how “exceptional” is their performance, for 
instance when compared with their most important neighbour? Furthermore, are there 
some common features of the patterns of GDP and life expectancy, and of their 
relationship, which can be observed in both Italy and Spain? There is a growing 
literature about the relation between improvements in life expectancy and the growth of 
GDP per capita, mostly based on contributions from the unified growth theory, where 
the demographic transition plays a crucial role in the transition from stagnation to 
growth (Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor 2012). A number of cross-country studies have 
found a positive effect of life expectancy, or a negative effect of mortality, on income 
                                                
2 Some combination of the two may also be used: Prados de la Escosura (2007) provides a long-run comparisons 
among European countries via combining cross-section and time series data. 
3 For an extended overview of cross-country studies with instrumental variables, see Durlauf et al. (2005). 
4 For Italy, see Fenoaltea (2003, 2005) and, more recently, Felice and Vecchi (2012). For Spain, see among the others 
Pons and Tirado (2006), Prados de la Escosura (2010a), Sabaté, Fillat and Gracia (2011), Prados de la Escosura, 
Rosés and Sanz-Villarroya (2012). For other countries, see for instance the remarkable study on Turkey: Altug et al. 
(2008). 
5 Unless of course the well-known series by Maddison (2010) are used, but when it comes to a detailed scrutiny of 
national cases Maddison’s estimates not always are reliable. For a criticism of Maddison’s Italian estimates, see 
Fenoaltea (2011). Fort time-series analysis using Maddison’s figures, see for instance Ben-David and Papell (2000). 
Time-series analysis with alternative estimates are usually limited to the industrial output: Crafts, Leyborne and Mills 
(1990); see also the Williamson project (Williamson, 2011). 
6 At least in four important aspects: both are catholic countries, share the Latin heritage (from neo-Latin language to the 
codified law), are late-comers in the European industrialization, and are medium-big sized countries with significant 
regional differences. 
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per capita (Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Gallup et al., 1999; Lorentzen et al., 2008), but the 
debate is still open: Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) have found no evidence of an 
impact of life expectancy on income growth, while more recent studies have suggested 
that the causal effect of life expectancy on growth is non-monotonic, i.e., it is negative 
although insignificant before the onset of the demographic transition, positive after that 
(Cervellati and Sunde, 2011). All these studies are based on cross-section comparison, 
and we believe that an important contribution to the debate may come from a time-
series approach. 
For our analysis, we work upon recent advancements in the historical research, 
which make possible to review and discuss the most updated series of GDP, as well as 
to present new long-run series of life expectancy for both Italy and Spain. In the case of 
GDP, we make use of the new series at constant prices for Italy (Baffigi, 2011; Felice 
and Vecchi, 2012), by many standards more reliable than the previous one included in 
Maddison (1991, 2010), and compare it with the one available for Spain produced by 
Prados de la Escosura (2003), which is incorporated in Maddison (2010) and unlike 
others (Maluquer de Motes, 2009a) looks more similar to the Italian one in its 
methodological approach. In the case of life expectancy, we link the most updated 
estimates, for Italy in benchmark years (Felice and Vasta, 2012) and for Spain (Blanes 
Llorens, 2007), with previously available information on life expectancy or mortality, in 
order to produce long-run comparable series running from 1861 to 2008. All these 
series are then confronted with those available for France, from well-known 
international database (Maddison, 2010; HDM, 2011a). 
For both the indicators, comparisons are made through simple quantitative tools 
such as graphs and growth rates, and more refined ones such as econometric testing. 
After presenting the new series, the main changes in the international economy, as well 
as in technological and socio-biological regimes, are introduced and employed as 
analytical grids to re-assess the performances of the two countries. As a further step, 
through time-series econometrics structural breaks in the series of per capita GDP and 
life expectancy are searched for, identified and discussed. 
The article is organized as follows. In section §2 we present our updated series of 
GDP and life expectancy for Italy and Spain, either if they are mostly new (per-capita 
GDP for Italy, life expectancy for Italy and Spain) or a simple refinement of the previous 
series to make the two countries more properly comparable (per-capita GDP for 
Spain). In §3 we present the results and introduce the discussion by way of two-pairs 
comparisons between Italy and Spain. In §4 we enter into a more detailed analysis, by 
way of historical grids based on the main international changes in the world economic 
history, as well as in technological and socio-biological regimes. Section §5 is 
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dedicated to discussing differences in structural breaks between the two countries and 
to the issue of (Granger) causality between life expectancy and GDP. Section §6 
concludes, by providing some answers to the abovementioned research questions. 
 
2. The data 
2.1. GDP per capita 
As known GDP was invented in the 1930s, in the US, and only after world war II it 
was progressively adopted by other countries, in primis those of western Europe. This 
is the reason why GDP figures for periods previous world war II are always the product 
of reconstruction by economic historians or statisticians. The Italian Istituto Nazionale 
di Statistica was one of the first institutions to engage itself in the task of providing a 
long-run series of Italy’s GDP, spanning from Unification (1861) until the 1950s (Istat, 
1957), but the results were on the whole disappointing, not least due to the opacity of 
sources and methods (e.g. Fenoaltea, 2010). Since the 1950s (Gerschenkron, 1955; 
Fenoaltea, 1969) until our days (Fenoealtea, 2003, 2005; Carreras and Felice, 2010; 
Battilani, Felice and Zamagni 2012), economic historians have tried to amend the main 
flaws by providing their own indices of national production, for specific sectors or 
periods. Only recently, under the joint auspices of Bank of Italy, Istat, and the 
University of Rome II, these efforts have been unified into a long-run series of Italy’s 
GDP, both at current and constant prices and spanning over 150 years, whose 
procedure and sources are fully verifiable (Baffigi, 2011; Brunetti, Felice and Vecchi, 
2011). Soon after it was released, the brand-new series has been updated (Felice and 
Vecchi, 2012), to include the last advancements in the literature covering the interwar 
years (Felice and Carreras, 2012). We make use of this latest series, after revising the 
per-capita figures in order to consider the population de facto, rather than the resident 
population, as should be “by the book” with Gross Domestic Product.7 In order to have 
the revised series, however, first we must estimate a series of the Italian de facto 
population at present boundaries; this is done through a few simple steps using the 
data of population de facto at historical borders, from official censuses in benchmark 
years, and the long-run series of resident population at historical and at present 
boundaries, from Istat (2012a).8 
                                                
7 By definition, per-capita Gross National Product should be based on resident population, per-capita Gross Domestic 
Product on present population. 
8 In more detail, as a first step the benchmarks of the population de facto at historical borders (referring to the years: 
1861, 1871, 1881, 1901, 1911, 1921, 1931, 1931, 1936, 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2011) are interpolated, 
with geometric average using the cycles of the resident population at historical borders; this way, a series of the 
population de facto at historical borders is obtained. As a second step, the series of the population de facto at historical 
borders is converted into the series of the population de facto at present borders, using for each year the coefficient 
“population at historical borders / population at current borders” from the series of resident population.  
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In the case of Spain, we have resorted to the estimate by Leandro Prados de la 
Escosura (2003), which was incorporated in Maddison (2010). This was not the only 
available series, however. Recently, Jordi Maluquer de Motes (2009a) has published in 
Revista de Economía Aplicada an alternative estimate of Spanish GDP at current and 
constant prices; the reply by Prados de la Escosura (2009) and a further clarification by 
Maluquer de Motes (2009b) were jointly published in the same journal. The two series 
are indeed quite different: for the years 1850 to 1970, the one by Maluquer is on 
average 24,5% higher than the one by Prados, and thus Spain’s backwardness as 
compared to the rest of Europe is significantly reduced (Escudero and Simón, 2010, p. 
234). The main reason of this discrepancy is due to the way different series at constant 
prices, based on different base years, are linked in 1958, that is in the year when the 
reconstruction by economic historians (1850-1958) and the one by the official national 
accounts (1958 to date) meet. Since the value from this latter is higher,9 a major 
problem is how to bridge this difference. Maluquer chooses to consider superior the 
new estimate from national accounts: therefore he accepts the difference, which is then 
rescaled to the historical series from 1958 backward.10 Prados’ alternative strategy is 
instead to consider the historical estimate made at historical prices more reliable than 
the new estimate made with a more recent price system, and thus to refuse the 
difference for 1958 (i.e, to take as good the lower value): the difference is then 
distributed onward until the next base year for the constant-price series, in this case 
1995; more specifically, it is allocated from 1958 to 1995 with weights increasing with 
the distance from 1958 (Prados de la Escosura, 2009, pp. 12-14). As a consequence, 
Prados’ series remains unchanged from 1958 backward, although the growth rate from 
1958 to 1995 is probably artificially increased. One second source of discrepancy is 
due to the fact that Maluquer uses one single deflator for all the series, the consumer 
price index, rather than implicit sectoral deflators as Prados does.  
Surely Prados’ approach pays more attention to the actual value of production in 
the past, by assuming that historical estimates in the base year at historical prices are 
more reliable than subsequent estimates made with different price systems (although 
there might be some reason for preferring instead Maluquer’s index, for instance the 
use of some updated historical information).11 Since we are interested in a comparison 
with Italy, we choose with little doubt Prados’ estimate, essentially because both its 
                                                
9 As usual, and mostly due to the different price-basis used. This happens because, when prices and quantities are 
inversely correlated, late-weight indices, such as those of national accounts, tend to grow slower than early-weight ones 
(e.g. Gerschenkron, 1947). 
10 Namely, for 1958 Maluquer enlaces his series to the official accounts produced by Uriel, Moltó and Cucarella (2000), 
which in 1958 has a GDP higher by 10.7% than the one estimated by Prados (Maluquer de Motes, 2009b, p. 35). 
11 The new series of population estimated by Maluquer himself (Maluquer de Motes, 2008) and the series about prices 
and consumption also reconstructed by Maluquer (Maluquer de Motes, 2005): as we are going to explain, the former is 
here incorporated in Prados’ index, since this can be done at no risk of weakening the consistency of Prados’ estimates. 
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deflation system based on implicit deflators, and the redistributing rule used to link 
deflators with different base years, are conceptually similar to the methods used for 
reconstructing the Italian series (and they are also in line with Maddison’s approach).12 
However, we find no reason for distrusting Maluquer’s new estimate of the Spanish 
population (Maluquer de Motes, 2008): the author provides a series which is for the first 
time geographically and methodologically consistent through the different periods of 
Spanish history, and always refers to the population de facto, the one which should be 
used for per capita GDP (as mentioned). Therefore, we incorporate these data in order 
to produce up-to-date estimates of per capita GDP based on the population de facto,13 
which is comparable to the one we have produced for Italy. The differences between 
the old and the new population series are noteworthy above all for the years following 
the 1929 crisis, where Maluquer’s new data for the first time include the emigrants 
returning from abroad: this results in higher estimates for the population and lower 
ones for GDP per capita and, as we will see (section §5), this change has some impact 
when it comes to search for structural breaks in the Spanish series.14 
Both series are expressed in a common unit of measure, 1990 international Geary-
Khamis purchasing power parity dollars (1990 G-K dollars, thereafter). For Spain, in 
Maddison (2010) Prados’ series of total GDP is already expressed in 1990 G-K dollars. 
For Italy, we have had to transform the new series by Felice and Vecchi (2012) from 
constant 2011 euros to constant 1990 liras, using the standard deflator for the Italian 
cost of living, from Istat (2012b); after this, Italian 1990 liras were converted in 1990 G-
K dollars, using the coefficient for Italy (1384.11 liras for 1 G-K dollar) reported in 
Maddison (2006, p. 189). 
The results are displayed in table 1. 
                                                
12 For Italy, see Baffigi, 2011, pp. 56-59; Brunetti, Felice and Vecchi, 2011, p. 234. See also Maddison (1991). 
13 We divide Prados’ series of total GDP by Maluquer’s series of population de facto. We use the population de facto at 
the 1st of July. 
14 The series of the population de facto for Italy and Spain are presented in the Appendix. 
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Table 1. GDP per capita (1990 K-S dollars) in Italy and Spain, 1861-2008 
 Italy Spain  Italy Spain  Italy Spain 
1861  1,556  1,246  1911  2,403  2,011  1961  6,401  3,452 
1862  1,576  1,243  1912  2,410  1,984  1962  6,782  3,805 
1863  1,614  1,263  1913  2,520  2,052  1963  7,137  4,148 
1864  1,616  1,258  1914  2,385  2,004  1964  7,348  4,504 
1865  1,714  1,215  1915  2,250  2,014  1965  7,607  4,747 
1866  1,711  1,273  1916  2,427  2,086  1966  8,045  5,044 
1867  1,562  1,263  1917  2,435  2,043  1967  8,596  5,321 
1868  1,594  1,133  1918  2,377  2,011  1968  9,153  5,580 
1869  1,615  1,170  1919  2,293  2,031  1969  9,688  6,029 
1870  1,654  1,198  1920  2,330  2,165  1970  10,207  6,328 
1871  1,618  1,290  1921  2,233  2,203  1971  10,333  6,633 
1872  1,581  1,465  1922  2,400  2,272  1972  10,664  7,109 
1873  1,573  1,590  1923  2,594  2,281  1973  11,335  7,666 
1874  1,654  1,454  1924  2,640  2,326  1974  11,878  8,155 
1875  1,663  1,493  1925  2,814  2,448  1975  11,554  8,350 
1876  1,621  1,517  1926  2,816  2,414  1976  12,301  8,602 
1877  1,631  1,667  1927  2,724  2,595  1977  12,554  8,835 
1878  1,672  1,617  1928  2,863  2,578  1978  12,908  9,029 
1879  1,677  1,518  1929  2,984  2,731  1979  13,625  9,066 
1880  1,703  1,643  1930  2,825  2,610  1980  14,052  9,191 
1881  1,754  1,673  1931  2,764  2,510  1981  14,149  9,167 
1882  1,777  1,684  1932  2,795  2,524  1982  14,194  9,269 
1883  1,794  1,714  1933  2,743  2,435  1983  14,346  9,448 
1884  1,769  1,709  1934  2,716  2,491  1984  14,803  9,535 
1885  1,796  1,658  1935  2,847  2,507  1985  15,206  9,683 
1886  1,837  1,616  1936  2,723  1,923  1986  15,634  9,961 
1887  1,885  1,584  1937  3,010  1,757  1987  16,127  10,487 
1888  1,877  1,641  1938  3,111  1,752  1988  16,790  11,022 
1889  1,821  1,633  1939  3,230  1,908  1989  17,341  11,568 
1890  1,824  1,632  1940  3,081  2,073  1990  17,678  12,050 
1891  1,850  1,666  1941  2,970  2,026  1991  17,929  12,319 
1892  1,851  1,784  1942  2,779  2,133  1992  18,090  12,382 
1893  1,879  1,714  1943  2,342  2,196  1993  17,944  12,206 
1894  1,889  1,727  1944  1,925  2,278  1994  18,348  12,453 
1895  1,904  1,708  1945  1,740  2,104  1995  18,901  12,756 
1896  1,932  1,570  1946  2,361  2,178  1996  19,141  13,026 
1897  1,934  1,645  1947  2,779  2,195  1997  19,512  13,490 
1898  1,926  1,754  1948  2,993  2,179  1998  19,812  14,055 
1899  1,946  1,761  1949  3,190  2,143  1999  20,123  14,660 
1900  1,997  1,786  1950  3,444  2,193  2000  20,880  15,377 
1901  2,029  1,899  1951  3,751  2,396  2001  21,284  15,882 
1902  2,064  1,828  1952  3,904  2,576  2002  21,233  16,107 
1903  2,086  1,817  1953  4,166  2,547  2003  20,971  16,333 
1904  2,126  1,795  1954  4,295  2,718  2004  20,993  16,595 
1905  2,173  1,758  1955  4,562  2,805  2005  20,849  16,912 
1906  2,250  1,838  1956  4,760  3,009  2006  21,070  17,322 
1907  2,294  1,885  1957  5,006  3,080  2007  21,154  17,623 
1908  2,345  1,947  1958  5,262  3,183  2008  20,608  17,501 
1909  2,368  1,967  1959  5,603  3,078      
1910  2,374  1,887  1960  5,963  3,094      
Sources and notes: see the text. 
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2.2. Life expectancy 
Measures based on GDP are not, of course, the only indicators of economic 
growth, not to mention of human welfare. A wide range of social indicators, from per 
capita calories to average heights, to life expectancy, can be used to supplement or 
integrate GDP − not only because of the lack of GDP historical figures (Steckel, 2009) 
− combined in composite indicators (among which the Human development index, HDI, 
is now by far the most successful one),15 or considered individually in a “dashboard” 
approach.16 Although estimating social indicators for past periods is in principle not 
more difficult than reconstructing GDP − on the contrary, this latter poses by far greater 
conceptual problems17 − international historical series of social indicators are badly 
lacking; nothing comparable with the impressive reach of the Maddison project, 
criticisable as it is. Before 1950, usually only benchmark estimates are available for 
education, heights, and nutrition. Things are a bit better for life expectancy: here some 
consistent series have been published, mostly thanks to the efforts by the Max Planck 
Institute for Demographic Research of the University of California (i.e., the Human 
Mortality Database, HMD hereafter);18 however, their database does not always include 
home-made research made by economic historians in specific countries and which, if 
properly assessed and possibly incorporated, could be useful to enlarge both the 
international scope and the historical coverage of the database. For Italy, a wide range 
of social indicators has been published in the recent book by Giovanni Vecchi (2011), 
in benchmark years; in the case of life expectancy, an alternative and more recent 
estimate has also been published, in benchmark years from 1871 to our days (Felice 
and Vasta, 2012). For Spain, the Nisal research project has now made available on-
line an impressive range of social and well-being indicators, including historical 
estimates of life expectancy previously published by Roser Nicolau (2005);19 
furthermore, for this country we now have very accurate new estimates of life 
expectancy in benchmark years (Cabré et al., 2002) and even in a yearly series from 
1911 to 2004 (Blanes Llorens, 2007), both of them thus far not considered by HMD.  
Thanks to this information, and to the available historical series published in the 
HMD, it is now possible to produce historical and consistent series of such an important 
social indicator as life expectancy, for both Italy and Spain spanning from 1861 until 
2008, which are therefore directly comparable with the GDP series of the previous 
                                                
15 UNDP (2010). For historical cross-country estimates, see Crafts (1997, 2002) and Prados de la Escosura (2010b); for 
Italy, see Brandolini and Vecchi (2011), Felice and Vasta (2012); for Spain, see Escudero and Simón (2010). 
16 Ravallion (2012). For Italy, see Vecchi (2011). 
17 Cfr. Boldizzoni, 2011, pp. 81-86. 
18 Freely available at: http://www.mortality.org/. 
19 Freely available at: http://www.proyectonisal.org/. 
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section. These new series of life expectancy are here presented and discussed for the 
first time.  
For Italy, the basic reference are the estimates recently published in Felice and 
Vasta (2012), in benchmark years spanning from 1871 to 2007: from 1911 these 
estimates are roughly the same as those published in the HMD;20 differences between 
the two are present for the early period, when, however, HMD’s researchers 
themselves consider their figures far less trustworthy.21 All these estimates − those by 
Felice and Vasta as well as those by HMD and even the Vecchi’s ones − are at 
historical borders and thus, for a proper time-series analysis, they need to be converted 
to current borders. This conversion is made possible thanks to the fact that Felice and 
Vasta report life expectancy data also for the Italian regions, at historical borders: we 
make the conversion under the hypothesis that the ratio between life expectancy in 
Trentino-Alto Adige and a part of what is now Friuli-Venezia Giulia (including Trieste) 
on the one side, and the rest of Italy on the other side, has remained unchanged from 
the liberal age (when Trentino-Alto Adige and a part of Friuli-Venezia Giulia were not 
part of the Italian Reign) to the interwar years (when following World War I these 
provinces were annexed). Once we have estimated the new benchmarks at current 
borders (for 1871, 1891, 1911, 1931, 1938, 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, 
2007), the yearly series is constructed by interpolating through the benchmarks the 
yearly series of HMD (2011b), through a geometric average; from 1861 to 1870, the 
series is produced by projecting backward the value of life expectancy in 1871, with the 
inverse of the mortality rate on resident population for the years 1862 to 1871.22 
If for Italy we have three sources of historical data for life expectancy, for Spain the 
sources are four. First, there are the benchmark figures published by Roser Nicolau 
(2005), mostly based on the estimates by the Spanish Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
(INE), running every ten years from 1900 to 1970, every five years from 1970 onwards, 
and with a last benchmark in 1998. Second, for the years 1908 to 2008 there is the 
yearly series by HDM (2011c). As expected, for corresponding years there are some 
differences between the benchmarks in Nicolau and the HDM series, which are due to 
different procedures of computing the population of Ceuta and Melilla and to the 
changes from the population de facto to the resident population; it is worth noticing, 
                                                
20 The Human mortality database provides an yearly series, at historical borders, from 1871 to 2008. Both Felice-Vasta 
and HMD differ from the benchmark estimates (which also are at historical borders) published in Vecchi (2011, p. 419), 
but to know the reasons of this discrepancy is impossible, at the present, because in the explanatory notes in Vecchi 
(2011, pp. 128-9) reference is made to an unpublished graduate thesis; in the case of Felice and Vasta, see the 
discussion at p. 35. 
21 Since “deaths counts are available only by five-year age groups (i.e., 0-4, 5-9,…, 65-74, 75+)” and “the data for 1883-
84 demonstrate clear patterns of age heaping” (Glei, 2011, p. 3).  
22 The series of the mortality rate is available from Istat (2012c), for all the years 1862 to 2009; as expected, the 
correlation between mortality and life expectancy, for the years 1871 to 2009, is very high:  Pearson coefficient of -
0.955, with R2 of 0.911. The value for 1861 is linearly interpolated, through a linear regression for the years 1862-1880, 
where year is the independent variable and life expectancy the dependent one. 
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however, that the HDM researchers do not seem aware of the previous work by Roser 
Nicolau,23 therefore they do not raise this issue (Glei et al., 2012). This is little harm, 
since both works should by now be considered mostly outdated, thanks to the research 
carried out by Anna Cabrè and her co-authors, and more recently by Amand Blanes 
Llorens, who was a PhD student of Cabrè. At first, Cabré et al. (2002, p. 127) have 
published five years estimates of life expectancy in Spain, beginning as early as 1860, 
and running until 1995. A few years after, a PhD student of Cabré has published yearly 
series of life expectancy in Spain, from 1911 until 2004, as part of his PhD thesis 
(Blanes Llorens, 2007). This work is truly impressive, boasting a level of accuracy and 
detail with no parallels in other previous and subsequent researches, including the one 
by HDM (apparently unaware of this work too, unlike Blanes Llorens who discusses 
their work);24 moreover, the results have never been published outside of the PhD 
thesis, and are here presented for the first time to a wider public.  
The higher level of accuracy of the work by Blanes Llorens can be exemplified by 
the way of coping with under-registration of infant mortality, an issue which had indeed 
some impact on the overall trend of life expectancy in Spain when compared to Italy, as 
we are going to see in the next section. According to the Spanish laws, until 1974 the 
newborns who died within the first 24 hours of life were counted in the official censuses 
as aborted foetuses, or stillbirths, while from 1975 onwards they were included in the 
mortality tables. Therefore, deaths were under-registered until 1974. In order to 
estimate life expectancy, Blanes Llorens has recounted the number of these “false” 
stillbirths from the demographic statistics (Movimiento Natural de la Población) of INE 
from 1911 to 1975, and has accordingly modified his tables for those years to make 
them fully comparable with the following period (Blanes Llorens, 2007, pp. 57-59). 
HDM researchers also had coped with this problem, but had corrected infant death 
counts only from 1930 onwards (Glei et al., 2012, pp. 3-5).  
Once we have accepted the new figures as superior, the only (minor) problem is 
that both the estimated series by Blanes Llorens, and the benchmark data by Cabré et 
al. are reported by sex, with no averages for the whole population; averages must 
therefore be calculated via the series of the population by sex, which is reconstructed 
from the data of official censuses for benchmark years (see Nicolau, 2004).25 At this 
point, the different data of life expectancy for the whole population can be linked and 
unified, with the aim of producing the most updated and at the same time coherent 
                                                
23 Whose first version was published as early as 1989 (Nicolau, 1989). 
24 For a full description of sources and methods, see Blanes Llorens, 2007, pp. 43-114. 
25 Namely, historical data of population by sex are available for the following benchmarks: 1860, 1877, 1887, 1897, 
1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1981, 1991, 2001, plus 2010. The annual series of the shares of 
female (and male) population is constructed via linearly interpolating the shares of the benchmarks, through the 
continuous compounded annual rate. 
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series of life expectancy for Spain.26 To this scope, for the years 1911 to 2004 we use 
the series from Blanes Llorens (2007); these are in turn linked to the five-years 
estimates by Cabré et al. (2002) from 1861 to 1910.27 In order to complete the cycle 
from 1861 to 1910, these are interpolated every five years, through geometric average, 
using the series of the inverse of mortality rates until 1907,28 from Nicolau (2005), then 
using for the last two years, 1908 and 1909, the life expectancy series from HDM 
(2011c). For the very last stretch (2005-2008), we link the estimates by Blanes Llorens 
to the series by HDM; needless to say, in the overlapping years of the last period their 
figures are practically identical.  
The new series are displayed in table 2. 
                                                
26 When it comes to econometrics, however, an alternative series constructed via linking the Nicolau data through the 
HDM estimates will also be tested, arguing that it shows statistical discrepancies that make us doubt of its reliability; 
alternatively, if the HDM series must be believed, it would reinforce rather than weaken the main results of the article. 
27 It is worth noticing that for the following period 5-years estimates by Cabré et al. are very close to the new figures by 
Blanes Llorens. 
28 Also in the case of Spain, for those years when it is possible to check for (i.e., from 1908 to 2001), we register a high 
correlation between mortality rates and life expectancy: Pearson coefficient of -0.958, R2 of 0.918. In the series of 
mortality rates the years 1871 to 1876 are missing, and they should be reconstructed via linear interpolation through the 
continuous compounded annual rate, from 1870 to 1877; since, however, we have an estimate of life expectancy for 
1875, the years of linear interpolation are indeed only four (1871 to 1874), plus one (1876). 
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Table 2. Life expectancy at birth (years) in Italy and Spain, 1861-2008 
 Italy Spain  Italy Spain  Italy Spain 
1861  32.1  30.3  1911  44.2  42.2  1961  70.1  69.7 
1862  32.0  31.0  1912  48.4  45.2  1962  69.4  69.7 
1863  31.9  30.4  1913  47.9  43.7  1963  69.5  69.8 
1864  33.1  29.7  1914  49.3  43.8  1964  70.6  70.6 
1865  33.0  29.1  1915  41.9  43.6  1965  70.5  71.0 
1866  33.9  34.1  1916  38.8  44.6  1966  71.2  71.2 
1867  33.1  32.6  1917  37.3  43.3  1967  71.2  71.4 
1868  32.4  28.7  1918  25.4  30.7  1968  71.0  71.7 
1869  35.5  28.3  1919  41.7  41.9  1969  71.1  71.2 
1870  33.1  30.1  1920  45.1  40.8  1970  71.8  72.2 
1871  33.2  30.3  1921  48.8  43.9  1971  72.1  71.8 
1872  33.6  30.5  1922  49.6  45.6  1972  72.3  73.0 
1873  35.5  30.7  1923  51.1  45.6  1973  72.2  72.8 
1874  35.4  30.9  1924  51.2  47.1  1974  72.8  73.1 
1875  34.7  31.1  1925  51.0  47.6  1975  72.7  73.6 
1876  36.9  31.2  1926  50.7  48.3  1976  73.0  73.9 
1877  38.1  31.3  1927  52.4  49.0  1977  73.3  74.3 
1878  37.2  31.5  1928  52.5  49.1  1978  73.6  74.5 
1879  36.5  32.0  1929  52.2  50.1  1979  73.8  75.0 
1880  35.0  32.1  1930  55.1  51.0  1980  73.7  75.5 
1881  36.3  31.4  1931  54.8  50.9  1981  74.0  75.7 
1882  36.2  30.5  1932  55.0  52.3  1982  74.5  76.3 
1883  37.0  32.1  1933  56.8  52.4  1983  74.4  76.1 
1884  38.4  28.3  1934  57.7  52.9  1984  75.2  76.5 
1885  38.5  31.7  1935  57.3  53.1  1985  75.3  76.4 
1886  36.6  32.9  1936  58.2  51.7  1986  75.7  76.7 
1887  37.3  33.5  1937  57.2  48.1  1987  76.2  77.0 
1888  38.2  34.9  1938  58.1  48.3  1988  76.4  76.9 
1889  40.3  34.1  1939  59.5  47.9  1989  76.8  77.0 
1890  39.5  34.1  1940  58.7  49.9  1990  76.9  77.0 
1891  39.4  34.4  1941  56.1  48.9  1991  76.9  77.1 
1892  39.5  34.7  1942  53.8  53.2  1992  77.3  77.5 
1893  40.1  34.6  1943  50.3  55.2  1993  77.6  77.7 
1894  39.9  34.1  1944  53.4  56.6  1994  77.8  78.1 
1895  39.3  35.0  1945  55.8  58.1  1995  78.0  78.2 
1896  40.1  34.5  1946  59.9  57.7  1996  78.4  78.3 
1897  42.4  35.6  1947  62.0  59.4  1997  78.6  78.8 
1898  41.1  35.6  1948  64.1  61.3  1998  78.7  78.9 
1899  42.1  34.7  1949  64.6  61.0  1999  79.1  78.9 
1900  39.9  34.5  1950  66.1  62.3  2000  79.5  79.4 
1901  41.3  35.8  1951  65.5  61.9  2001  79.8  79.7 
1902  41.0  38.0  1952  66.1  65.0  2002  80.0  79.8 
1903  41.3  39.6  1953  66.8  65.7  2003  80.1  79.7 
1904  42.7  38.4  1954  68.1  66.9  2004  80.9  80.2 
1905  42.4  38.1  1955  68.5  66.7  2005  80.9  80.2 
1906  43.7  38.0  1956  67.9  66.7  2006  81.3  80.8 
1907  44.2  40.5  1957  68.0  66.6  2007  81.4  80.8 
1908  42.1  42.0  1958  69.1  68.8  2008  81.6  81.1 
1909  43.8  41.6  1959  69.5  68.7       
1910  46.0  41.5  1960  69.4  69.4       
Sources and notes: see the text. 
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3. How close, how far? A comparison by pairs of indicators (1861-2008) 
 
The Italian and the Spanish series of GDP per capita, at constant prices (1990 K-S 
dollars), are displayed in the left side of figure 1, while in the right side the two series 
are confronted with the one available for France (the main neighbouring country of both 
Italy and Spain).  
 
Figure 1. Per capita GDP in Italy and Spain, 1861-2008 
 
Sources and notes: table 1; data for France are from Maddison (2010). 
 
The story of the “race” between Italy and Spain can be summarized as follows: Italy 
began at a higher level, but lost some ground in the first decade following Unification; 
from the 1870s until the mid of the 1930s there was a slight ledge in favour of Italy, 
more or less unchanged through the ups and down from the end of the nineteenth 
century until the Spanish Civil War; after World War II, for fifteen years (1946-1961) the 
Italian gap toward Spain dramatically enlarged, but since the early 1960s Spain began 
to converge. From this outline we may therefore identify four phases: 1) the first 
decade (1861-1871), following Italy’s Unification, when Italy had a lead in per capita 
GDP between 20 and 40% over Spain; 2) the following longer phase (1872-1935), until 
the Spanish civil war, when the difference between the two countries was relatively 
mild, between 0 and 20% in favour of Italy; 3) a third phase (1946-1960), characterized 
by a growing gap in favour of Italy, from 6% in 1946 to a remarkable 91% in 1960; 4) 
then the final period when, although through ups and downs, Spain has converged 
towards Italy, reducing that gap down to 17-18% in 2008 − that is, to around the level 
which had characterized the second phase.  
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Further insights come from a comparison with France, as from the right side of the 
figure. Until the second half of the XX century, both Italy and Spain are declining 
relatively to France: Italy indeed was falling behind only until 1899, thereafter remaining 
more or less stable (although, again, through ups and downs); Spain instead continued 
to lose ground as late as until 1960. In the second half of the XX century, however, the 
two countries began steadily to converge, first Italy and later Spain. At the end of the 
1980s Italy indeed even overcame France29, but then from 2001 it has fallen behind 
again; conversely, Spain has continued to converge until 2008.  
In short, Italy has passed from the status of European periphery to which it was 
confined until World War II, much closer to Spain than to France, to the one of 
European core in the second half of the twentieth century, but this status is now in 
doubt. Instead Spain began to converge later towards the European core, but its 
catching-up has not yet come to a halt (at least, not until 2008). 
It is interesting to see as this evidence compares with the one we now have for life 
expectancy, whose new series for Italy and Spain are displayed in figure 2. Unlike with 
GDP, here at the beginning Italy’s gap towards Spain enlarged, throughout the first 
decades following Unification up to the end of the XIX century; however, Spain began 
to converge at the beginning of the XX century, to reach Italy in the 1960s. There is 
here some discrepancy with the previous life expectancy data available for Spain, 
according to which the convergence of Spain began fifteen years earlier, around the 
second half of the 1880s, and closed some years before, in the decade following world 
war II; the discrepancy is indeed due to the fact that official censuses, and even HDM 
until 1930, underreported infant mortality, as we have seen in the previous section. 
Lastly, it is worth stressing as in terms of life expectancy in the second half of the 
1990s there was a new «reversal of fortunes», with Italy once again taking the lead.  
                                                
29 The surpass is confirmed by GDP figures based on resident population. It should be remember that all these 
comparisons are at 1990 purchasing power parity (PPP), i.e., based on the differences in the cost of living observed in 
1990. 
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Figure 2. Life expectancy in Italy and Spain, 1861-2008 
 
Sources and notes: elaborations from table 2; data for France are from HDM (2011a). 
 
In broad terms, we can say that there are two important similarities between the 
patterns of GDP per capita and life expectancy: the initial advantage of Italy; the 
convergence of Spain over the long-run. It is worth reminding that the convergence of 
Spain is confirmed by a wide range of other indicators of well-being, from heights,30 to 
per capita calories,31 to composite indicators such as the Human Development Index, 
which a part from income and life expectancy includes education and where Spain has 
indeed overtaken Italy in the last years.32 
At a closer inspection, however, it is also clear how the two indicators differ in at 
least two more important respects: first, in life expectancy Spain began to converge in 
advance and even overtook Italy as early as the 1960s, i.e., when its convergence in 
per capita GDP had only begun; secondly, in life expectancy Italy in turn overtook 
Spain again in the late 1990s, i.e., at the same time when Spanish convergence in per 
capita GDP remarkably accelerated. Indeed, in the patterns of life expectancy we can 
also detect four phases, but this are significantly different from those of GDP: the first 
phase, 1861-1899, is one of growing divergence in favour of Italy; the second is the 
one of Spanish convergence, from 1900 to 1961, some ups and downs 
notwithstanding; a third phase, from 1962 to 1998, shows indeed a slight edge in 
favour of Spain; then comes a fourth final phase (1999 to date), which shows a new 
slight edge in favour of Italy. 
                                                
30 For Italy, see A’Hearn and Vecchi (2011, p. 57); for Spain, see María-Dolores and Martínez-Carrión, (2011, p. 35) and 
Martínez-Carrión and Puche-Gil (2011, pp. 444 and 447). 
31 For Italy, see Sorrentino and Vecchi (2011, p. 417); for Spain, see Cussó Segura (2005). 
32 For Italy, see Felice and Vasta (2012); for Spain, see Prados de la Escosura (2010b). 
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As for per capita GDP, also for life expectancy we can compare Spain and Italy with 
France (right side of figure 2). Here around 1861 France has a lead over Italy even 
higher than the one in GDP. Italy, however, began to converge soon, starting in 1863, 
and practically reached France around the mid of the 1950s; soon after convergence in 
GDP had begun, and well before it was completed. This is similar to what we have 
seen for Spain in comparison with Italy. During the last decades, Italy is improving its 
position in life expectancy also with respect to France, which by 1999 has been 
surpassed. Conversely Spain passed through more ups and downs and began to 
steadily converge towards France later than Italy, in the last years of the XIX century; it 
reached the same level of France roughly a decade after Italy, in the middle of the 
1960s. At the beginning of the 1970s, Spain indeed overtook France as well, and 
managed to maintain such a lead throughout the 1980s. During the last two decades 
Spain and France rank practically at the same level, although Spain is slightly falling 
behind − once again, in sharp contrast with GDP.  
From these comparisons, in the patterns of GDP and life expectancy some 
regularities or common features come out, which are worth being discussed. The first 
common feature is about the starting point: differences in GDP mirror those in life 
expectancy at lower levels of development; in these early stages, a clear lead in GDP 
results into a clear lead in life expectancy, and viceversa. This finding is not new: in the 
contemporary world, there is a strong correlation between life expectancy and income 
in poor countries, as displayed for example by the well-known Preston (1975) curve, 
and the same can be said for historical periods when material conditions were low (e.g. 
Fogel, 2004). By analysing the historical data for 16 western countries, in benchmark 
years from 1870 to 2000, Livi Bacci (2012, p. 125) has efficaciously simplified the 
reasons: “more food, better clothing, better houses, and more medical care have a 
notable effect on those who are malnourished, badly clothed, poorly housed, and 
forced to trust fate in case of sickness.”   
The second regularity concerns the trend, i.e. the pattern of convergence: we 
observe that convergence in life expectancy begins earlier than the one in GDP. On 
this, we can say something more: we have convergence in life expectancy when the 
leading country (France in the case of Italy, or Italy in the case of Spain) is in the rising 
bend of its industrial transformation (which at the early stages may well have some 
negative consequences on life expectancy), while at the same time the follower is 
benefitting from a decline in mortality coming from breakthroughs in medicine and 
social conditions, but has not undertaken yet its industrial transformation. Although 
some tests of causality are needed (see further, section §5), this finding appears to be 
in line with recent results stemming from unified growth theory, which stress a positive 
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impact of improvement in life expectancy upon economic growth, after the onset of the 
demographic transition (Galor and Weil, 2000; Cervellati and Sunde, 2011).  
Finally, the third regularity we observe concerns the last period: at higher levels of 
development, further advancements in GDP may not result into advancement in life 
expectancy: the two indicators are no longer necessarily correlated. Indeed, it even 
seems that, if at this stage any correlation between the two can be established, this 
would be of a negative sign: countries falling behind in life expectancy may forge ahead 
in GDP, and viceversa. This result may be true well beyond the three countries here 
under investigation − think of the opposite evidence of the United States (forging ahead 
in GDP but falling behind in life expectancy) and Japan (similar instead to Italy) − and 
can be of some interest in order to re-model growth economics for nowadays rich and 
ageing countries. Demographers and economists have only begun to address this 
point. Concerning the impact of GDP on life expectancy, we may quote again Livi Bacci 
(2012, p. 125): “When increased production benefits already prosperous population the 
effects are minimal or nonexistent, if not negative, as may be the case with overeating 
and environmental deterioration.” The opposite impact of increased life expectancy on 
GDP growth also deserves some attention: in the context of the “second demographic 
transition” (Lestaeghe and Van de Kaa, 1986; Lestaeghe, 2000), when fertility has 
gone below the replacement level, or the so-called “longevity transition” (Eggleston and 
Fuchs, 2012), when the most part of additional years in life are realized late in life, very 
high life expectancy may result into a disproportionately old population, which hampers 
economic growth. In this respect our findings are thus in line with those recently 
proposed by Eggleston and Fuchs (2012) for the United States.  
 
4. Historical periodizations 
 
After presenting the new series, we now analyse the growth rates of Italy and Spain 
according to the different historical ages.33 In the left column of table 3 we can see the 
main ages of (economic and political) world contemporary history: the first globalization 
era (ca. 1861-1914), the break-up of the system and the autarky going from world war I 
to world war II (ca. 1914-1948), then the golden age (ca. 1948-1973), the end of 
Bretton Woods and the oil shocks (ca. 1973-1985), finally the second globalization era 
(beginning roughly in 1985, the year of the counter-shock in oil prices).34 This broad 
                                                
33 In order to smooth the consequences of specific yearly shocks, we make use of (3-period) simple moving averages. 
For the first and the last years of the series, data are from a 2-period simple moving average, using the subsequent 
(1862) or the previous (2007) year respectively. 
34 E.g. Hobsbawm (1987, 1994). According to Hobsbawm, the last period should begin with the fall of the Berlin Wall 
(1989). We prefer 1985 because this was the year when the trend in oil prices changed, which ultimately contributed 
also to the fall of the Soviet Union; 1985 was also the year when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in Soviet Union, 
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historical framework is useful to discuss both GDP per capita and life expectancy, 
prima facie at least. 
 
Table 3. Growth rates in GDP per capita and life expectancy, by historical periods 
 GDP per capita Life expectancy 
 Italy Spain France Italy Spain France 
1861‐1914  0.80  0.92  1.12  0.70  0.67  0.23 
1914‐1948  0.66  0.21  0.89  0.93  0.96  0.93 
1948‐1973  5.46  5.16  4.26  0.52  0.75  0.45 
1973‐1985  2.52  2.03  1.70  0.34  0.40  0.33 
1985‐2008  1.39  2.60  1.56  0.34  0.25  0.32 
1861‐2008  1.78  1.82  1.71  0.64  0.66  0.46 
Sources: elaborations from tables 1 and 2. Notes: see text. 
 
For what concerns GDP, Spain grew more than Italy in the liberal age, but Italy 
outperformed Spain in the interwar years; Italy again grew more rapidly than Spain in 
the golden age and the following period; Spain, at last, grew more rapidly than Italy in 
the last stretch, after joining the European Community in 1986. If we look at life 
expectancy, however, we have exactly opposite results: that is, Italy grew more rapidly 
than Spain in the first period, but then more slowly in the following three periods; it 
grew again more rapidly in the last period. When including France in our analysis, this 
sort of negative correlation is partly confirmed: in GDP per capita, France outperformed 
both Italy and Spain in the first two periods, when indeed it lagged behind in life 
expectancy; although in the third and fourth phases both Italy and Spain converged in 
GDP and life expectancy, then again in the last stretch France outgrew Spain in life 
expectancy although was losing ground in GDP, and it outgrew Italy in GDP per capita 
but was losing ground in life expectancy.  
In light of what we have seen in the previous section, these different performances 
do not come as a surprise. Indeed, they can be seen as qualifications of two out of the 
three main results from the previous section: convergence in life expectancy began 
earlier than the one in GDP (thus during the liberal age Italy outperformed in life 
expectancy Spain and France, whereas in the following phase Spain outperformed 
both Italy and France); at later stages of development, further advancements in GDP 
did not result into advancements in life expectancy, and viceversa. It is also worth 
noticing that these different cycles took place within similar trends over the long-run: for 
both GDP and life expectancy, highest growth of Spain, the less advanced country, 
lowest growth of France, the most advanced one, with Italy in the middle. In other 
words, there is a common trend of convergence, which is in part the product of the fact 
                                                                                                                                            
beginning a series of reforms which were to change the world in a handful of years. Furthermore, in 1985 agreement 
among the EEC members was reached on the Single European Act (SEA); the SEA was signed one year later, the 
same year when Spain joined the EEC. 
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that in terms of backwardness in each country the initial conditions were similar for 
GDP per capita and life expectancy − the third of our results from the previous section.  
A different kind of periodization focuses on the international changes in 
technological regimes for GDP per capita, in socio-biological regimes for life 
expectancy; that is, on those conditions which may specifically have an impact either 
upon GDP per capita, or upon life expectancy. With reference to technological regimes, 
a well-established literature (Freeman and Perez, 1988; Perez, 2002, 2010) considers 
four different ages: steam engine and railways (from the end of the nineteenth century 
until 1875, i.e. for our purposes from 1861 to 1875), steel and electricity (1875-1908), 
the era of combustion engine, oil, and mass production (1908-1971), then telematics 
and the new economy (1971 to date). 
A periodization through technological regimes would makes little sense for life 
expectancy, since these affect mostly GDP;35 in this case, we should rather look at 
changes which affect specifically this variable, related to scientific, socio-demographic 
and biological advancements and which we may call socio-biological regimes. The 
main issue is mortality reduction. In a recent article, Cutler et al. (2006) have reviewed 
the determinants of mortality reduction over the long-run, identifying three main 
phases: the first one, roughly from the mid-XVIII century to the mid-XIX century, when 
improvements in nutrition played the major role; a second one, from the mid-XIX 
century to the 1930s, when the reduction in mortality rates was driven by public health 
measures, the construction of urban infrastructures allowing for running water with 
indoor plumbing (which provided clean water and the removal of waste), and good 
advice about personal health practices; a third phase, starting in the 1930s, when the 
main determinant was the advent of modern medicine, to begin with vaccination and 
antibiotics. This framework is here partly refined and enlarged. Concerning the 
refinement, the dividing line between the first two phases is postponed to the last 
decade of the XIX century; the authors themselves recognize that “big public health did 
not fully come into its own until the acceptance of the germ theory of disease in the 
1880s and 1890s, which led to a wave of new public health initiatives and the 
conveyance of safe health practices to individuals” (Cutler at al., 2006, p. 102; Mokyr, 
2002; Tomes, 1998).36 Concerning the enlargement, a fourth phase going from the 
                                                
35 This is not necessarily always true, however. An alternative and more inclusive periodization of technological regimes 
considers running water with indoor plumbing as one of the three central innovations − together with electricity and the internal 
combustion engine − of the second industrial revolution, which accordingly began in 1870 and lasted for about a century (Gordon, 
2012). Running water with indoor plumbing had a huge impact upon the standard of living and life expectancy, and is here 
considered in our periodization specific for life expectancy (see forward).  
36 More specifically, we should talk of infectious diseases (measles, scarlet fever, diphtheria), respiratory diseases 
(bronchitis, pneumonia, influenza), and intestinal diseases (diarrhea, enteritis) (Livi Bacci, 2012, p. 122). The germ 
theory was fully accepted only after Robert Kock published its postulates in 1890, although these were partly known 
from 1875 (Madigan and Martinko, 2005). It should be added that the decision by Cutler et al. about the dividing line in 
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1960s until our days is here added: thanks to the development of modern medicine 
(mostly antibiotics in the 1930s and 1940s), in fact, by 1960 “mortality from infectious 
diseases had declined to its current level” (Cutler at al., 2006, p. 103); furthermore, 
from the 1960s the main driver for the decrease of mortality, at least in the advanced 
countries,37 had become the reduction in cardiovascular disease mortality and the 
decline in infant mortality (Cutler at al., 2006, p. 104), the latter also due to the 
improvements in neonatal medical care for low birth-weight infants; at the same time, 
from the 1960s the demographic transition is  by now completed or under completion,38 
while also the role of nutrition changed, from quantity to quality.  
In view of this, in the case of life expectancy we propose the following periodization 
for «socio-biological» regimes: a) from the mid XVIII century until 1890, i.e. in our case 
1861-1890, when improvements in nutrition are the main determinants of the reduction 
in mortality; b) 1890-1935, when the main drivers are hygienic health practices and the 
construction of health and hydraulic infrastructures, in part following the application of 
the germ theory; c) 1935-1960, when the reduction in mortality was driven by modern 
medicine, to fight against infectious diseases; d) 1960-2008, characterized by on-going 
improvements in the reduction of the death toll of cardio-vascular diseases and 
neonatal mortality, as well as by the completion of the demographic transition. 
The results according to the two periodizations, technological regimes for GDP per 
capita and socio-biological regimes for life expectancy, are displayed in table 4. Once 
again, we record contrasting results according to the indicator used. In GDP per capita, 
Spain performs better than Italy in the (last stretch of the) first technological regime, 
while performs clearly worst in the following two regimes; Spain again performs better 
in the age of telematics (which for Spain is also the age of constructions). In life 
expectancy, on the contrary, Italy performs better in the first socio-biological regime, 
while it is outperformed by Spain in the following two; in the last period, life expectancy 
has on average the same growth rate in both countries. These differences are a 
consequence of the fact that Italy began to improve in life expectancy before than in 
GDP per capita, and earlier than Spain; when Spain was converging in life expectancy, 
Italy was forging ahead in GDP per capita, as we have seen; after both countries had 
reached very high levels of life expectancy, their growth rates became similar.  
                                                                                                                                            
the mid of the XIX century was based upon the experience of England, which at that time was the most advanced 
country: for a comparison between the causes of death in England and Italy, see Caselli (1991). 
37 In Italy, from Unification until the mid-1950s infant mortality reduced by 226‰ to 51‰, thus by a ratio of more than 
four times; however, in the following half a century it would have further collapsed by a ratio of more than ten times, 
down to 4,4‰ by 1999-2002 (Felice, 2007, p. 115). In Spain, convergence in infant mortality took place after 1960 
(Nicolau, 1989, pp. 57 and 70-72.)  
38 Some differences among countries notwithstanding: in Spain, the demographic transition was completed later than in 
other countries, during the 1980s (Carreras and Tufanell, 2004, p. 38). In Italy, it lasted from 1876 to 1965, as in other 
European countries such as Germany (Livi Bacci, 2012, p. 118; Chesnay, 1986, pp. 294 and 301). 
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A part from confirmations, when looking at France there is another important result 
coming out of table 4. In life expectancy France was the leading country at the 
beginning of the period, but in terms of growth rates it was outperformed by both Italy 
and Spain in all the four socio-biological regimes; conversely, in GDP per capita France 
− although here too it was ahead of both Italy and Spain at the beginning of the period 
− in some technological regimes performed better than either Italy (the first regime), 
Spain (the third one), or even both (the second one). This evidence suggests that 
convergence in GDP per capita should not be taken for granted, unlike the case of life 
expectancy, where instead convergence through different regimes seems to be less 
reversible. The fact that convergence in life expectancy can be more permanent does 
not mean, however, that it is more stable, as we are going to see in the next section.  
 
Table 4. Growth rates in GDP per capita and life expectancy, by technological and 
socio-biological regimes 
Techno-
logical 
regimes 
GDP per capita Socio-
biological 
regimes 
Life expectancy 
Italy Spain France Italy Spain France 
1861‐1875  0.36  1.28  1.06  1861-1890 0.75  0.38  0.22 
1875‐1908  1.07  0.80  1.13  1890-1935 0.83  0.96  0.62 
1908‐1971  2.40  1.99  2.15  1935-1960 0.75  1.11  0.75 
1971‐2008  1.90  2.64  1.72  1960-2008 0.33  0.33  0.29 
1861‐2008  1.78  1.82  1.71  1861-2008 0.64  0.66  0.46 
Sources: elaborations from tables 1 and 2. Notes: see text. 
 
5. Structural breaks and (Granger) causality 
 
5.1. Structural breaks 
Thus far, we have compared growth rates at different ages, in order to discuss as 
exogenous changes may have impacted upon domestic performance. In the above 
framework, the historical ages have been defined through the evolution of the 
international scenario and of technological and socio-biological regimes, both of them 
exogenous to the national context. It is now time to turn to time series analysis, in order 
to detect if there are some breaks in the series which can be referable not only to 
external shocks (such as World War II) and exogenous changes, but also to internal 
and country-specific breaks, whether or not they are in response to exogenous 
changes. On this, a time-series analysis has the advantage of not imposing any ex-
ante periodization, thus being useful to see as the international context interacts with 
the evolution of domestic scenario.39 
                                                
39 Moreover, in terms of clarity at this point a time-series analysis is far more efficacious than further comparisons of 
growth rates based on more historical ages, this time defined in terms of national and country-specifics changes (which 
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 In order to search for structural breaks in the series, we run the Quandt Likelihood 
Ratio (Quandt, 1960) or QLR test, which is a modified Chow test used to identify 
unknown structural breaks (Andrews, 1993). We follow the procedure presented in 
Stock and Watson (2007), here adapted from an autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) 
model in levels, with one lag, to a first-differenced autoregressive (AR) model, with two 
lags (Torres-Reyna, 2012).  
First, let’s have a first-differenced autoregressive model with two lags, AR(2): 
 
[1] yt = β0 + β1yt-1 + β2yt-2 + γ0Dt(τ) + γ1[Dt(τ)*yt-1] + γ2[Dt(τ)*yt-2] + εt; 
 
where Dt(τ) is a binary variable, which equals 0 before the break (τ), 1 after: 
 
[2] Dt(τ) = 0, if t ≤ τ; Dt(τ) = 1, if t ˃ τ; 
 
in absence of break, the regression function is the same before and after τ, thus γ0 
= γ1 = γ2 = 0. Accordingly, we test: 
 
H0  γ0 = γ1 = γ2 = 0 
H1 not H0  
 
i.e., under the null hypothesis (H0) we have no break, while under the alternative 
hypothesis (H1) we have break, since at least one γ is different from zero. Let’s F(τ) be 
the F-statistics testing H0. If the break date τ is unknown, as in our case, the QLR test 
calculates the highest value of F(τ) in the interval τ0 ≤ τ ≤ τ1: 
 
[3] QLR = max [F(τ0), F(τ0 + 1), … , F(τ1)] 
 
This QLR statistic may identify one single structural break, several structural 
breaks, or even a slower evolution of the regression function. For our tests, we set τ0 = 
0.1*T,  τ1 = 0.9*T, which results in a 10% trimming from each tail. Although 0.15*T and 
0.85*T are more commonly used for τ0 and τ1 respectively, we prefer a shorter trimming 
since it allows us to identify more structural breaks around the extremes of the 
distribution, as we will see, whereas the results for the central years of the distribution 
                                                                                                                                            
would be the subject of endless discussion and would take this article far astray from its promised goals): to define 
international ages was relatively easy, given the wide (but not unanimous) consensus about the main epochs of world 
contemporary history, not only in terms of broad geopolitical scenarios, but also for what concerns technological and 
socio-political standards; historical grids resulting from domestic changes, specific for Italy and Spain, would be far less 
undisputed, while any comparison would be blurred by the fact that the historical grids would not be the same between 
Italy and Spain. 
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remain unchanged.40 Two more caveats are warranted: 1) to have comparable results, 
we always use log transformation for both GDP and life expectancy; 2) in order to 
ensure that possible differences are not the product of different methodologies 
estimates, for each function we test two different series, our new one (Tables 1 and 2), 
and the main alternative available series. The tests are displayed in figure 5 (GDP per 
capita) and 6 (life expectancy). 
From figure 3, the main result is that in the Italian series GDP many more structural 
breaks can be observed than in the Spanish series.41 For Italy, there are a number of 
breaks from 1877 to 1888, a period roughly coinciding with the rise to power of what is 
called the Historical Left (1876) and the first protectionist and pro-industrialist policies 
pursued by those governments.42 The second break, which is visible with the lower 
threshold (6.02) from the 15% trimming, comes at the end of the century, in 1899, and 
marks the beginning of the Giolitt’s age (1900-13) and the take-off of the Italian 
industry.43 Then comes the biggest break, the one at the end of world war II, with the 
beginning of unprecedented growth – the economic miracle − which would have 
brought back the country “from the periphery to the centre” (Zamagni, 1993), as the 
sixth world economic power. Finally, a fourth and negative break can be noticed, in 
1993, coinciding with an economic recession and the first significant austerity 
measures to join the euro, and which marks the beginning of Italy’s economic decline 
(Felice and Vecchi, 2013). 
Confronted with this story, the series of Spanish GDP looks much flatter: the breaks 
come in the second half of the 1950s and reach the highest value in 1960, following the 
Franco’s liberalization and the end of autarchy. The 1960 maximum marks the 
beginning of the Spanish economic miracle, with a fifteen-years delay on Italy.44 In 
other words, in terms of GDP Spain did not experience the breaks Italy lived through in 
the second half of the nineteenth century, i.e., Italy’s early ruptures towards higher 
economic growth: Spanish modernization in GDP began later and took place all at 
once. This results is significantly different from the one found by Molinas and Prados 
de la Escosura, with previous series for Italy and Spain, and benchmark comparisons 
between the two: according to them Spain and Italy would have attained similar levels 
of per capita income at around the same historical dates, but Spain converged later 
                                                
40 Critical values of the QLR statistics with a 10% trimming are from Andrews, 2003. 
41 The QLR test has been run also for France, but no significant breaks have been found (the highest observed break is 
in 1959); this is probably due to the higher level of GDP boasted by that country. Results will be provided on request to 
anyone interested. 
42 The first trade protections were introduced in 1878, significantly reinforced in 1887, while the first Italian enterprise of 
the second industrial revolution (steel, electricity) were born in the first half of the 1880s, even with the help of the state 
(as in the case of Terni, in steel). For extensive discussion on these topics, see Toniolo (1990), Zamagni (1993), 
Federico and Tena-Junguito (1998), Fenoaltea (2011). 
43 For a recent reappraisal, see Felice and Carreras (2012). 
44 Or a bit less, since in Italy’s high growth rates of the early years following World War II were can be regarded as the 
“backlash” of world war II destruction − i.e., the product of the Reconstruction. 
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than Italy in structural change (Molinas and Prados de la Escosura, 1989). Such a 
discrepancy was only apparent: indeed, also in per capita GDP Spain began to 
modernize later than Italy. 
Limitedly to Spain, our finding is in line with the results by Pons and Tirado (2006), 
who making use of a variant of Andrews (1993) methodology45 also had found the lack 
of breaks in the Spanish (Prados’) GDP series before the civil war, with a positive 
break as late as 1960.46 Pons and Tirado also found two negative breaks in 1936 and 
1940, the difference with us being due to the fact that we use the updated population 
series by Maluquer: via counting the returns of Spanish emigrants after the 1929 crisis, 
Maluquer finds higher numbers for the population de facto in the first half of the 1930s 
(Maluquer de Motes, 2008) and correspondingly reduces the level of GDP per capita 
for the same period; as a consequence, in our estimates the percentage decrease due 
to the civil war is also reduced. 
Our results are also consistent with an earlier vast literature stressing the missed 
opportunities of the Spanish economy from the last decades of the XIX century until the 
Franco’s liberalization policies in 1959: there was an essential continuity, characterized 
by sluggish economic growth and international isolation, from the Bourbon Restoration 
(1874-1923), to the dictatorship of Primo De Rivera and the short-lived Second 
Republic (1923-1939), to the first phase of Franchism (1939-1959) (Fraile, 1991; Nadal 
and Sudrià, 1993; Carreras 1990, 1997; Velarde, 1999). Accordingly, the first phase of 
Franchism, negative as it was (Carreras 1989; Comín, 1995; Prados de la Escosura, 
1997), should be seen not so much as an interlude, but rather as an enduring 
constraint which delayed of about fifteen years the modernization of the Spanish 
economy.  
 
                                                
45 The Sup Wald test by Vogelsang (1997), extended by Ben-David and Papell (2000) to estimate multiple break-points. 
Unlike us, Pons and Tirado use an auto-regressive model in levels. 
46 For a pioneering application of Andrews methodology to the Spanish historical series of GDP, again with analogous 
results, see also Cubel and Palafox (1998). 
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Figure 3. Structural breaks in GDP per capita, QLR tests (10% trimming) 
 
Sources and notes: see the text. 
 
It is worth stressing that this difference between Italy and Spain is not a product of 
the series here used. Quite the contrary, the use of alternative series would result in 
even greater differences. As can be seen again from figure 3, the earlier Italian series 
by Maddison, which was mostly based on the old Istat’s estimate,47 show a 
considerable number of breaks throughout the liberal age, thus suggesting an evolution 
of the regression function until the most significant break in 1898: once again, soon 
before the beginning of Giolitti’s age, and soon after birth of the German-style universal 
banks, which Gerschenkron (1955) regarded as the substitutive factor of Italy’s 
industrialization. The difference with Spain could hardly be more remarkable, and it is 
indeed attenuated by our new series. In the case of Spain, the alternative series 
provided by Maluquer does not change significantly the Spanish story in terms of 
structural breaks: either we believe Prados or Maluquer, until the mid of the twentieth 
century there are no structural breaks in the Spanish per capita GDP. 
The results for life expectancy are significantly different (figure 4). In this case, it is 
Spain to experience a number of structural breaks, whereas the Italian series is much 
more stable and indeed, having not been for the negative break of World War II, it 
                                                
47 With the exception of some industrial sectors for which the new estimates by Fenoaltea were used (Maddison, 1991). 
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would have experienced no break at all. Once again, it should be emphasized as this 
discrepancy is not a result of the series we use: as it can be seen, the Italian data do 
not change significantly when passing from ours figures to the HDM’s,48 and in the 
case of Spain we have indeed a higher (not a lower) number of breaks with the old 
series: as with GDP, the differences between Italy and Spain are softened rather than 
reinforced by the use of the new series. 
How can this discrepancy between GDP and life expectancy be explained? From 
what we have seen thus far, one could be tempted to say that this is simply the result 
of the fact that in Spain convergence in life expectancy began earlier. But at a closer 
inspection this does not seem to be the case. For what concerns life expectancy, in 
fact, the break in the Spanish series are of negative sign, which means that they are 
due to an abrupt rise of mortality in specific years. This higher sensitiveness to 
mortality is indeed a product of backwardness, not of modernization, and can even be 
seen as the other face of the delayed Spanish modernization in GDP: although Spain 
tends to converge earlier in life expectancy than in GDP, thanks to the spread of 
modern medicine and basic infrastructures, due to its delay in GDP it remains a poorer 
country with a larger agricultural sector, well up to the 1960s. As a result, although life 
expectancy is on average relatively high, in specific years it can remarkably fall from its 
heights: because of the longer permanence of poverty and malnutrition, which make a 
higher share of the population weaker in the face of other calamities, such as the 1918 
Spanish flu pandemic.49  
 
                                                
48 With no surprise, given that the cycles are the same and only the benchmarks differ. 
49 We can have many confirmations of this, from different indicators which are not necessarily average growth of GDP. 
For example, we may look at the regional dispersion of industrialization and economic growth: in Spain, during the first 
century of our series industrialization interested regions with a fraction of population minor than in the case of Italy; i.e., 
in Spain the agrarian regions where in demographic terms more important than in Italy. In Spain, the population of 
Catalonia, Madrid and the Basque Country, the three most industrialized regions of the countries, passed from 16% in 
1857 to 22% in 1950. At the same time, in Italy the population of the regions of the industrial triangle (Piedmont, Liguria, 
and Lombardy) was always above 25%; if we include the region of Rome, which had services more than industry, the 
population was around 30-32%. For Spain, see the estimates in Rosés et al. (2010) and population figures in Nicolau 
(2005); for Italy, see the estimates in Felice (2010, 2011) and population figures in Felice (2007, p. 16). 
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Figure 4. Structural breaks in life expectancy, QLR tests (10% trimming) 
 
Sources and notes: see the text. 
 
 
To sum up, in both Italy and Spain life expectancy tends to move along a positive 
rising trend, with no structural positive breaks (unlike GDP per capita, where instead 
we have one or more breaks which mark the beginning of modern economic growth); 
but life expectancy still is characterized by negative breaks, which are stronger where 
modernization in GDP is delayed − in Spain − and weaker when modernization in GDP 
is more advanced − in Italy (and in France, whose results from QLR test in life 
expectancy are analogous to those for Italy).50   
This result is an important qualification of the last finding from the end of the 
previous section: even though the pattern of convergence through different periods is 
much less reversible in life expectancy than in GDP, since convergence begins earlier 
in life expectancy, it is also more subject to temporary turbulences, or specific yearly 
shocks; precisely because of the lack of modernization in GDP. Although in life 
expectancy there is a positive trend of convergence which begins earlier and over the 
long run is less reversible than in the case of GDP, the cycle of life expectancy is more 
unstable, at least until the advent of a positive trend of convergence also in GDP.  
                                                
50 Results will be provided on request. 
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5.2. Granger causality 
We may now turn to the correlation between life expectancy and GDP per capita. 
We test if there is some impact of the growth of life expectancy on the growth of GDP, 
or viceversa, and if this impact changes with the level of development. A first 
approximation is by way of cross-correlograms, a visual tool commonly used in 
descriptive statistics to estimate the degree to which two stationary time series are 
correlated and if one anticipates the other.51 As can be seen from figure 5, over the 
long run it is life expectancy which anticipates GDP, not viceversa, and this effect is 
stronger in Italy and Spain, than it is in France. These two results are in turn the 
product of two findings from the previous sections: the fact that in both Italy and Spain 
convergence in life expectancy began earlier than convergence in GDP, from which the 
anticipation of life expectancy on GDP; and even the fact that as both GDP and life 
expectancy grow their link becomes weaker, which may explain why the anticipation 
looks milder in the case of France, the most advanced country.  
 
Figure 5. Cross-correlograms of life expectancy and per capita GDP 
 
Sources and notes: see the text. 
 
Tests of Granger causality confirm only in part the results from descriptive statistics, 
but this is because of the differences between countries we have detailed thus far: Italy 
fits the expectations, but Spain and France don’t, either because too backward (Spain) 
or too advanced (France). A variable x is said to Granger-cause another y, if the latter 
                                                
51 Given two series x(i) and y(i), with i = 1, 2, … N-1, the cross-correlation r at delay d is defined as:  
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where x  and y are the means of the corresponding series which, in our case, are logarithm of life expectancy and 
GDP per capita (log transformation is employed to ensure stationarity). Correlation series, as those displayed in Figure 
7, result from computing [4] for a certain number of delays d. For an introduction to this method, see Chatfield (1980, pp. 
169-174). 
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can be better predicted using past values of both x and y, than it can by using past 
values of y alone; it is worth reminding that this doesn’t mean that a change in x will 
cause a change in y, but only that past values of x contain useful information to foresee 
the changes in y, besides the information contained in past values of y (for example, 
because the two series are co-integrated) (Granger, 1969).52 One way of testing for 
Granger causality is through OLS, by regressing y on lagged values of y and x: if the 
coefficients of the lagged x are statistically significantly different from 0, then it can be 
argued that x Granger-causes y (Stock and Watson, 2007). Let’s have an 
autoregressive distributed lag model, ADL(4,4), in levels:  
 
[5] yt = β0 + β1yt-1 + β2yt-2 + β3yt-3 + β4yt-4 + δ1xt-1 + δ2xt-2 + δ3xt-3 + δ4xt-4 + εt; 
 
we test 
H0  δ1,… δ4 = 0 
H1 not H0  
 
i.e., under the null hypothesis (H0) we have no Granger causality, while under the 
alternative hypothesis (H1) we have it. 
The F-statistics of the coefficients of the lagged x are displayed in table 5, either 
when the dependent variable is life expectancy, and thus x is GDP per capita, or when 
the dependent variable is GDP per capita, and thus x is life expectancy.53 We also 
introduce a break in the series, corresponding to the maximum value from the QLR 
tests in the series of GDP series, 1945 for Italy and 1960 for Spain, which is intended 
to be a threshold between a less advanced and a more advanced economic status: 
accordingly, we test Granger regressions for three model, the long-term one (1861-
2008), the one for the years before the GDP break, and the one for the years after that. 
 
                                                
52 The presence of Granger causality is a necessary but not sufficient condition of co-integration: the lack of Granger 
causality ensures that the two series are not co-integrated, whereas the presence of Granger causality does not 
necessarily mean that the two series are co-integrated. We have co-integration when the difference between a pair of 
integrated series is stationary. An “internal visualization way” of explaining co-integration is the one provided by Granger 
himself, in his Nobel lecture: “Suppose that we had two similar chains of pearls and we threw each on the table separately, but for 
ease of visualization, they do not cross one another. Each would represent smooth series but would follow different shapes and have 
no relationship. The distances between the two sets of pearls would also give a smooth series if you plotted it. However, if the 
pearls were set in small but strong magnets, it is possible that there would be an attraction between the two chains, and 
that they would have similar, but not identical, smooth shapes. In that case, the distance between the two sets of pearls 
would give a stationary series and this would give an example of cointegration” (Granger 2004, p. 422).  
53 In all these cases, we use log transformation to ensure that the series are stationary. 
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Table 5. Granger causality via OLS: F statistics of the coefficients of the lagged x 
 x: life expectancy x: GDP per capita 
 F Prob > F F Prob > F 
Italy      
1861-2008 3.55 0.0087*** 1.59 0.1807 
1861-1945 2.63 0.0414** 4.82 0.0017** 
1946-2008 1.09 0.3693 1.59 0.1924 
Spain     
1861-2008 1.61 0.1745 1.47 0.2144 
1861-1960 1.18 0.3272 1.51 0.2062 
1961-2008 0.56 0.6935 1.91 0.1298 
France     
1861-2008 1.47 0.2135 1.44 0.2255 
Sources and notes: see the text. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 
level.  
 
The results indicate the presence of Granger causality only in the case of Italy. 
Here, on the long-run life expectancy Granger-causes GDP per capita; moreover, 
Granger causality is concentrated in the first part of the series (1861-1945), as 
expected, when both life expectancy and GDP per capita are lower; in this first part, 
also GDP per capita in turn Granger-causes life expectancy. The lack of Granger 
causality in the Spanish series can be explained with the higher volatility of the Spanish 
series of life expectancy, which is subject to negative shocks well up to the second half 
of the twentieth century. In the case of France, the lack of Granger causality can 
instead be referable to the higher development of this country, which in fact according 
to QLR tests does not even experience a significant break in the series of GDP per 
capita. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
After reviewing and updating the available estimates, and in some cases by taking 
advantage of unpublished material, this article has presented and discussed long-run 
series of GDP per capita and life expectancy for Italy and Spain (1861-2008). Our goal 
was not only to briefly reconsider the economic history of both countries by the light of 
the new evidence, but also to investigate the long-run evolution of GDP per capita and 
life expectancy, and their mutual relationship, by way of country comparisons and a 
time-series approach. After contrasting the series for Spain and Italy with the available 
series for their most important (and common) neighbour, France, the new data have 
been analysed through historical periodization and time-series econometrics.  
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Generally speaking, over the long-run convergence is confirmed for both the 
indicators: at the beginning of the period, Spain is the country most backward in life 
expectancy and GDP, but over the entire period it is also the country converging at the 
highest average rate; Italy ranks in the middle between Spain and France. The long-run 
convergence notwithstanding, significant cyclical differences between the two countries 
can be observed. Namely, Spain began to modernize later in GDP, which may have 
had as a consequence higher volatility in life expectancy until recent decades. Italy, by 
contrast, showed a more stable pattern of life expectancy, following early breaks in the 
GDP series; but it also showed a significant and negative GDP break in the last 
decades, a result which reinforces worries about its recent economic decline. 
A part from the common convergence process, we find evidence or confirmation for 
four more major features in the patterns of GDP per capita and life expectancy. First, at 
the early stages of development, when both GDP and life expectancy are low, 
differences in GDP mirror those in life expectancy: a clear lead in GDP results into a 
clear lead in life expectancy. Second, convergence in life expectancy tends to begin 
earlier than convergence in GDP: in line with results from unified growth theory, after 
the onset of the demographic transition the growth of life expectancy seems to 
anticipate and may even cause the growth of GDP. Third, at later stages of 
development, when both GDP and life expectancy are higher, further advancements in 
GDP may not necessarily result into advancements in life expectancy, and viceversa: if 
any, there may be even a negative correlation between the two variables. Lastly, we 
observe that in life expectancy there is a positive trend of convergence which over the 
long run is less reversible than in the case of GDP, but the cycle is more unstable, until 
the advent of a positive trend of convergence also in GDP: since in the less advanced 
country convergence in life expectancy begins earlier than in GDP, here the former is 
also more subject to temporary turbulences, or specific yearly shocks, perhaps 
precisely because of the lack of modernization in GDP.  
When tests of causality are run, because of the four common features we have 
recalled above, it results that the growth of life expectancy anticipates the growth of 
GDP, but life expectancy Granger-causes GDP only in the case of Italy; furthermore, 
this is true only for the first part of the period, before the maximum break in the series 
of GDP in the middle of the twentieth century. For Spain and France we do not have 
Granger causality, either because the country is too backward, such as Spain with a 
much higher volatility in life expectancy, or too advanced, such as France. These 
results confirm that the relation between life expectancy and income is non-monotonic 
and may be subject to many historical qualifications, as suggested also by a recent 
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literature stemming from unified growth theory; needless to say, at the moment they 
are limited to the countries considered in this article.  
 
Table A.1. Population de facto in Italy and Spain at present boundaries, 1861-2008 
(thousands) 
 Italy Spain  Italy Spain  Italy Spain 
1861  25770  15729  1911  35583  20054  1961  49904  30764 
1862  25935  15870  1912  35891  20175  1962  50258  31110 
1863  26123  15982  1913  36071  20299  1963  50647  31452 
1864  26324  16067  1914  36425  20494  1964  51083  31821 
1865  26528  16121  1915  36955  20733  1965  51504  32186 
1866  26756  16188  1916  37198  20938  1966  51884  32550 
1867  26908  16283  1917  37128  21124  1967  52256  32932 
1868  26995  16317  1918  36764  21306  1968  52612  33288 
1869  27172  16308  1919  36585  21226  1969  52980  33580 
1870  27375  16327  1920  36817  21348  1970  53362  33832 
1871  27546  16365  1921  37192  21506  1971  53745  34118 
1872  27717  16405  1922  37568  21736  1972  54113  34468 
1873  27872  16446  1923  37923  21933  1973  54553  34818 
1874  27992  16487  1924  38253  22114  1974  54991  35162 
1875  28119  16529  1925  38588  22314  1975  55345  35547 
1876  28325  16570  1926  38906  22545  1976  55622  35984 
1877  28556  16612  1927  39232  22787  1977  55852  36430 
1878  28742  16686  1928  39550  23029  1978  56043  36838 
1879  28916  16790  1929  39813  23277  1979  56181  37208 
1880  29027  16893  1930  40114  23536  1980  56275  37535 
1881  29167  17011  1931  40434  23856  1981  56336  37829 
1882  29365  17122  1932  40756  24236  1982  56388  38081 
1883  29552  17202  1933  41101  24625  1983  56501  38306 
1884  29777  17298  1934  41465  24982  1984  56586  38507 
1885  30025  17356  1935  41824  25317  1985  56638  38690 
1886  30209  17425  1936  42169  25655  1986  56659  38852 
1887  30373  17532  1937  41908  25773  1987  56674  39001 
1888  30538  17604  1938  41677  25831  1988  56697  39138 
1889  30733  17654  1939  42221  25601  1989  56719  39260 
1890  30936  17674  1940  42795  25846  1990  56742  39367 
1891  31097  17709  1941  43292  26021  1991  56765  39487 
1892  31303  17773  1942  43672  26094  1992  56784  39650 
1893  31522  17847  1943  43960  26284  1993  56896  39807 
1894  31740  17911  1944  44191  26516  1994  56973  39948 
1895  31923  17956  1945  44460  26765  1995  56993  40074 
1896  32105  17978  1946  44859  27018  1996  57010  40190 
1897  32328  18034  1947  45292  27248  1997  57047  40307 
1898  32542  18208  1948  45752  27526  1998  57043  40421 
1899  32752  18431  1949  46225  27801  1999  57021  40529 
1900  32946  18573  1950  46720  28017  2000  57061  40654 
1901  33159  18682  1951  47159  28185  2001  57110  40797 
1902  33391  18840  1952  47373  28360  2002  57551  41314 
1903  33603  19041  1953  47630  28588  2003  57984  42005 
1904  33823  19216  1954  47937  28819  2004  58408  42692 
1905  34059  19342  1955  48235  29040  2005  58822  43398 
1906  34284  19451  1956  48487  29268  2006  59223  44068 
1907  34519  19564  1957  48713  29509  2007  59610  44874 
1908  34762  19690  1958  48970  29788  2008  59983  45593 
1909  35012  19821  1959  49289  30100      
1910  35305  19940  1960  49617  30418      
Sources and notes: for Italy, see the text; for Spain, Maluquer de Motes (2008) until 2001 and 
Ine (2012) for the years 2002 to 2008. 
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